Marquette Law Review
Volume 44
Issue 3 Winter 1960-1961

Article 7

Federal Income Taxation: Relation of Tax Valuation
to Income Tax Basis
Michael Wherry

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Michael Wherry, Federal Income Taxation: Relation of Tax Valuation to Income Tax Basis, 44 Marq. L. Rev. 384 (1961).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol44/iss3/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

[Vol. 44

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

standard in the Stan-Jay Auto Parts case. 15 It rejected the union's disclaimer of responsibility for the disruption of deliveries, holding that
there is no legislative history to justify so qualifying the word "effect."
The union reasonably should have anticipated that the picket line would
induce employees to refuse to cross it, said the Board, and the union
took no steps to insure that the picket line would not have this normal
effect. Therefore, the Board held that, whatever may have been the
union's subjective intent, at least objectively the picketing was intended
to disrupt services.
If the "normal effect" of the picket line is to deter outsiders from
crossing it, then it appears that the "intent" factor will be disposed of
as it was in the Stan-Jay Auto Parts case, and the primary question
in the Stork Club case and in future cases will be whether the effect is
"substantial," i.e., is the refusal of one, two, or three outside workmen to cross the picket line sufficient to proscribe all informational
picketing? The answer to these and the myriad other questions involved
in Section 8(b) (7) remain to be determined by the Board and the
courts.
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Federal Income Taxation: Relation of Estate Tax Valuation
To Income Tax Basis-In 1939 plaintiffs, a brother and sister, inherited from their father 510 shares of stock in a closely held Brazilian
corporation. At the time of this acquisition they were respectively 15
and 12 years of age. The stock was valued by local appraisers at par
value which amounted to $11,857.50 when converted at the existing
exchange rate. The executors of the estate used this valuation for estate tax purposes, but also submitted a consolidated balance sheet of the
company, showing the book value of the stock to be $273,686.40.
A deficiency was assessed against the executors in 1943. However,
the only upward valuation relating to the stock in question was an
$11,857.50 increase based upon the use of an incorrect conversion rate
in 1939. The stock was sold by the plaintiffs in 1947 for $258,948.20.
The basis used for computing long-term capital gain was $27,618.04.1
Subsequently a suit for refund was filed, wherein the plaintiffs contended that the fair market value of the shares in 1939 was $331,418.40,
and thus in excess of the price realized at sale. They presented evidence
indicating that their alleged basis2 was, in fact, actual market value in
15 Supra note 11.
16 For a discussion of some of the other problems under Section 8(b) (7), see
McDermott, Recognstional and Organizational Picketing under Amendments
to the Taft-Hartley Act, 44 Marq. L. Rev. 1 (1960).
1 This figure is slightly higher than the amended estate tax valuation of $23,715,
however, the court offered no explanation for the increase.
2 Since the amount of $331,418.40 is considerably higher than the 1939 book
value, apparently the plaintiffs' evidence embodied more than this. The opinion
gives no indication as to what constituted the additional evidence.
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1939. Held: The taxpayers were permitted to adjust the basis and
were allowed recovery of the 1947 overpayment; the Government's
defenses of estoppel and conclusiveness of the estate tax valuation
were invalid. In addition the court interjected the possibility of allowing the Government to recoup the underpaid estate tax against plaintiffs' claims for a refund. This was ultimately rejected with two judges
dissenting on the denial of recoupment and one on the estoppel decision. Ford v. U.S., 276 F. 2d. 17 (Ct. Cl. 196G).
In attempting to confine the plaintiffs to their original basis valuation, the Government relied upon the Commissioner's interpretation of
the applicable statutory provision,3 as set forth in the Treasury Regulations: "The value of property as of the date of the death of decedent
as appraised for the purpose of the Federal estate tax-shall be deemed
' 4
to be its fair market value at the time of acquisition.
The court followed the generally accepted interpretation of this
Regulation, by affording the estate tax valuation prima facie weight
as evidence of fair market value. 5 The conclusiveness of the valuation
has frequently been rebutted both by taxpayers 6 and by the Government.7 In light of the plaintiffs' uncontroverted evidence, the rejection
of the Government's contention was virtually inevitable. Although an
3 Int. Rev. Code of 1939 Sec. 113 (a) (5) "The basis of property shall be the
cost of such property except that ... (5) Property transmitted at death. If
the property was acquired by bequest, devise or inheritance . . . the basis
shall be the fair market value of such property at the time of such acquisition." Int. Rev. Code of 1954 Sec. 1014 is applicable today. It specifies that
the fair market value of the property at the date of death or the optional
valuation date is controlling, as opposed to "the time of acquisition" under
the 1939 provision. This constitutes a clarification rather than an alteration,
since by judicial interpretation the time of acquisition was deemed date of
decedent's death. See Elizabeth G. Augustus, 40 B.T.A. 1201 (1939).
4 U.S. Treas. Reg. 111 See. 29.113 (a) (5) -1 (c) (1943) ; U.S. Treas. Reg. 118
Sec. 39.113 (a) (5) -1 (c) (1953); U.S. Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.1014-2 (a) (5)

(1958).

5 "Except where the taxpayer is estopped by his previous actions or statements,

such value is not conclusive but is a presumptive value which may be rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence". 3A Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation See. 21.95 at 248, 249 (1958).
6 In Estate of Virginia Evans Devereux, P-H 1948 TC Mem. Dec. Par. 48,208
(1948), petitioner was allowed to change her estate tax valuation of real
proprety. The testimony of two real estate experts was decisive in allowing
the upward valuation. So also in McCahill v. Helvering, 75 F. 2d 725 (8th
Cir. 1935) the appraisal of an expert was sufficient to overcome the presumption established by the estate tax valuation. But see McEwan v. Commissioner,
241 F. 2d 887 (2nd Cir. 1957) where the testimony of the taxpayer's stock
experts was not given effect when it contradicted a detailed analysis of the
corporate structure furnished the Commissioner by another valuator. Generally see Plaut v. Munford, 188 F. 2d 543 (2nd Cir. 1951), and Elizabeth G.
Augustus, 40 B.T.A. 1201 (1939).
7Helen S. Delone, 6 T.C. 1188 (1946) furnishes a unique form of rebutting
evidence. The original $125 per share valuation placed on securities by the
Commissioner was successfully readjusted by him at the time of disposition
to $100 per share. Since the taxpayer was required by the testator's will to sell
for $100 per share, the court held that the income tax basis could not exceed
the compulsory sale price, notwithstanding a different estate tax valuation.
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attempt was made to strengthen the force of the Treasury Regulation,8
by alligning with it the authoritativeness of the initial appraisal, even
the court noted the Government's almost passive reliance on this point.9
Presumably aware of the weakness of his position, the Commissioner contended that the taxpayers should be estopped from changing
the valuation. The essence of the argument proceeds from the requirement that a taxpayer furnish accurate statements of fact in any return
filed. Since this was not done by the executors of the estate, should
the plaintiffs now be rightfully estopped from altering a misstatement
made by their fiduciaries? With little elaboration or definitive reasoning, the court concluded that the basis for an estoppel did not exist. A
brief analysis of the elements of an estoppel illustrates that: (1) there
must be conduct amounting to a representation or concealment of a
material fact, which fact is known by the party estopped or should be
known by him; (2) the party claiming estoppel must be unaware of the
true facts or unable to ascertain them at the time they were acted upon;
(3) the conduct must be relied upon to the extent that the claimant
would suffer a loss if the other party be permitted to repudiate his conduct and assert rights inconsistent therewith.10
In applying these criteria to various fact situations, the courts have
gone to considerable lengths to afford the taxpayer a means of escaping
the conclusiveness of errors reported in tax returns. May Rogers11 involved a situation quite similar to the Ford case. The co-executors,
having evaluated stock for estate tax purposes, sought to place a higher
valuation upon the shares when they were later disposed of by-the executors in an individual capacity. An increase was allowed on the
grounds that "the value of property as of a particular date is a matter
of opinion and evidence. Mere expressions of opinion cannot be regarded as misrepresentations of fact to work estoppel."12 The same
distinction between opinion and fact has been drawn with regard to
real property.' 3 It appears that in the area of debatable valuations the
party pleading the estoppel must proceed with the burden of proof along
different lines. To deny that a dubious valuation is not a matter of
8 Supra note 4.
Ford v. United States, 276 F. 2d 17, 21 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
10 10 Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation Sec. 60.02 (1958).
1131 B.T.A. 994. (1935) aff'd 107 F. 2d 394 (2d Cir. 1939). Although this decision
was non-acquiesced in by the Commissioner, XV-2 Cum. Bull. 45, (1936) it has
never been overruled nor criticized by the courts and has been cited in numerous other tax cases.
12 Id. at 1004.
13 Northport Shores Inc., 31 B.T.A. 1013 (1935), Non-acq. XIV-1 Cum. Bull.
34 (1935). Here the estate tax valuation was determined by the Commissioner to be $125,000. The petitioner originally claimed it was $112,500.
substantiating this figure by the opinion of a reputable appraiser. Later, upon
disposition she was permitted to establish a $250,000 basis upon the testimony
of other appraisers more familiar with the land.
9
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opinion would not only contradict the obviousness of the situation but
also impose a seemingly insurmountable burden of establishing a de
facto value at the time of the estate tax computation. This latter task
was unsuccessfully attempted in the Ford case. However, the Internal
Revenue Service, as evidenced by its non-acquiescence in the preceeding cases, takes a dim view of allowing basis changes simply because
the original valuation involved a high degree of opinion. A taxpayer
seeking such a change in analagous situations may be forced to litigate.
Even in litigation an alternative proof of the actual falsity of the
original valuation quite clearly would estop a taxpayer. The Government's base case in the Ford decision, Alamo National Bank v. Commissioner,14 involved the omission of an asset as a liquidating dividend
in the petitioner's 1921 tax return. Upon disposition of the acquired
business the court estopped the taxpayer from attaching a value to the
franchise. The tone of the opinion indicates that, in fact, there was a
value in 1921, and to omit it entirely revealed an underlying bad
faith in accounting methods and procedure. The contrast between
a clear-cut omission and a mistaken valuation appears to be one
criterion upon which the court reached an opposite result in the
Fordcase by denying estoppel.
The other basic difference between Alamo National Bank and Ford
relates to the availability of the true facts.'5 The Commissioner cannot
assert estoppel where he is in a. position to know the true facts. By
furnishing a consolidated balance sheet to the Government, which was
referred to in the 1943 proceeding, there existed an excellent possibility
that the gross discrepancy between the estate tax valuation and the
book value of the stock would be detected. When contrasted with a
complete omission, it is possible that the court partially distinguished
the two cases on this basis. However, the volume of tax returns handled by Internal Revenue would make a distinction, solely on this
point, seem rather inequitable. 6 Each particular case involves a balancing of the Commissioner's position to know the true facts, against the
F. 2d 622 (5th Cir. 1938).
10 Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation Sec. 60.03 (1958). See
Hull v. Commissioner, 87 F. 2d 260 (4th Cir. 1937), Estate of William Steele,

1495
'5

34 B.T.A. 173 (1936) ; Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F. 2d 483 (1st Cir. 1948).

16 Commissioner v. Liberty Bank and Trust Co., 59 F. 2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1932)

affords an ideal example of the rationale behind the treatment of taxpayer

claims for adjustment or inclusion, where there originally was an omission
on the taxpayer's part. Alleged worthless debts were collected and the court
estopped petitioner from attaching an original value upon them to avoid their
inclusion as income in the year of collection. "The Commissioner of necessity
does and must rely largely upon the representations of the taxpayer, and in
order to estop the taxpayer from assuming a contrary position, he is not

compelled to look with suspicion upon all such representations and himself

examine or cause to be examined the financial condition of all the taxpayer's
debtors. It is the duty of the taxpayer to deal fairly and truthfully with the
government."

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

taxpayer's duty to report them as such. In considering this duty the
court stated:
The fact that it did not do so (discover the discrepancy) did not
relieve the executors of the estate of the responsibility of taking
notice of it, and correcting the valuation stated in the return
which they had filed before time.17

Seemingly the court is denying the decisiveness of the Government's
oversight. However, considerable weight was given to the age of the
plaintiffs in 1939 and their inability to ascertain the true facts.' 8
In lieu of the mitigating circumstances of the Ford case i.e. (1)
the lack of an established market value of the stock; (2) the failure
by the Government to notice the gross inconsistency between the estate
tax valuation and the book value of the stock; (3) the minor status of
the plaintiffs and their dissociation with the executors; the necessary
elements of an estoppel were not clearly proved. The fact that the
statute of limitations expired and barred a later reassessment of the
estate tax will not sustain a strict plea of estoppel. The element of
detriment is present, 19 but per se it is insufficient to offset the equities
in favor of the taxpayer.' 0
Upon its own volition the court considered the possibility of permitting the Government to recoup the barred estate tax against the
overpayment in income taxes. The doctrine of recoupment has been
frequently invoked in tax cases, notwithstanding its inherent incon2
sistency with the statute of limitations. 1
The cornerstone of the pro-recoupment argument was set forth in
Bull v. U.S.,22 where the Supreme Court permitted an executor to re-

coup an estate tax payment against an income tax deficiency that arose
when the money, previously considered a part of the estate corpus, was
deemed income. The gist of the opinion constituted an attempt to superimpose an equitable alternative upon the rigid restrictions of the statute
of limitations. The court in the Ford case rejected a broad application
17Supra note 9, at 22.
is Judge Littleton in his dissenting opinion disagrees with the majority on this
point. He feels that since the executors were acting for and on behalf of the
plaintiffs, the latter should be bound by the executor's representations.
The ultimate result of the case might justify such a conclusion, but in
light of the possibility of a recoupment, the equitable nature of estoppel
would be violated by holding a party bound by statements of an executor not
voluntarily selected by him.
'9 Tidewater Oil Co., 29 B.T.A. 1208 (1934) indicates that the detriment to the
government may consist of allowing the statute of limitations to run.
20See: Northport Shores Inc., 31 B.T.A. 1013 (1935) ; and May Rogers, 31 B.T.A.
994 (1935); aff'd 107 F. 2d 394 (1939) for illustrations of the harshness in
refusing to accept estoppel as a defense.
21 See: Lyeth v. Hoey, 112 F. 2d 4 (2nd Cir. 1940) ; Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296 (1946) ; McEachern v. Rose, 302 U.S. 56 (1937)
Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532 (1937).
22295 U.S. 247 (1935).
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of the doctrine and relied on Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery
23
Co.,

which limited recoupment to its present day status,2 4 by making

it a prerequisite that both claims arise out of the same transaction. It
is also essential that the cross-claiming parties be identical, i.e. a taxpayer cannot recoup another's overpayment against his own deficiency.2 5
In analyzing the possibility of a recoupment against the plaintiffs,
the court admitted that the facts present a strong argument in favor of
allowing it. The determining factor, however, was the non-existence
of a single taxable event. The receipt of the stock in 1939 and its later
disposition in 1947 were deemed separate transactions. Both of the
dissenters disagreed, contending that the original valuation was the
sole event upon which the separate taxes were based. Their argument
2G
finds considerable support in cases allowing the taxpayer recoupment.
U.S. 296 (1946). Here a taxpayer was denied recoupment where he sought
to offset erroneously paid excise taxes, recovery of which was barred by the

23 329

statute of limitations, against an assessment for income taxes levied against
a refund paid to him. The refund consisted of excise taxes paid in years
other than those barred by the statute of limitations. The Court distinguished
Bull v. U.S. on the grounds that only one transaction was involved in the
Bull case, i.e. receipt of income by the estate, whereas here there was (1) the
payment of the excise taxes and (2) the inclusion of a refund in taxable income for the year 1935.
24The evolution of recoupment in tax cases necessarily has involved consideration of Code provisions which deal with the problem of barred claims, refunds

and set offs. Int. Rev. Code of 1954 Secs. 1311-1315, providing for corrections
and adjustments of errors, are inapplicable where the prior error and the subsequent refund or deficiency claim do not both relate to an income tax item.

Thus, where a barred estate tax is sought to be recouped against an income
tax overpayment, it must be done on the basis of the recoupment established

by judicial interpretation. See: U.S. Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.1311 (a) -2(b) (1956) ;

Also see, Note 52 Harv. L. Rev. 300 (1938), construing 52 Stat. 581 (1938),
the enactment upon which See. 1311-1315 are based. Int. Rev. Code of 1954

Secs. 6514 (b) and 6401 (a) prohibit the crediting of an overpayment against
a barred tax liability. Seemingly these provisions would automatically eliminate recoupment as a defense for the Government. In fact, the earlier counterparts of these statutes were the basis for denying such a defense in
McEachern v. Rose and Lyeth v. Hoey, supra note 21. However, the history
of recoupment indicates that the equities of the particular fact situation are
determinative rather than a strict adherence to such provisions. The Court
in Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery, supra note 23, did not even consider
the applicability of the statutes, but reached its decision by distinguishing the
facts of the case from the judicially developed recoupment. If Secs. 6514 (b)
and 6401 (a) were controlling in this type of case it would seem incongruous
for the courts to afford them anything less than the utmost importance. There
was no mention of the provisions in the Ford case and there appears to be an
obvious disregard for their applicability, at least, where equitable tangents
and elements of estoppel run in favor of the Government.
25 See 10 Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation Secs. 58.42 and 60.05
(1958). However, where the Government sets up recoupment as in Stone v.
White, 301 U.S. 532 (1937), a three party situation often arises. There the
barred claim against a trust beneficiary was set off against the trustees who
mistakenly paid the tax, on the heory that a refund would ultimately inure
to the benefit of the beneficiary.
20 Mills v. U.S., 35 F. Supp. 738, 739 (N.D. N.Y. 1940). "It is sufficient if it
(the claim) arises out of the same subject matter, and that the claims are
susceptible of adjustment in one action." In U.S. v. Herring. 240 F. 2d 225
(4th Cir. 1957) the plaintiff acting as administratrix paid an estate tax in 1949
based on the net estate. Subsequently the government levied a deficiency
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The Ford case illustrates a fact situation offering strong possibilities
of allowing the equitable principles of estoppel and recoupment to
govern. Although the former was not sufficiently established, the court
seems to have engaged in an independent analysis of recoupment, divorcing its equitable foundation from the consequences of their decision. By stringently enforcing the "single transaction" requirement, in
effect the court permitted the plaintiffs to evade their estate tax liability
under circumstances which place a greater degree of fault upon their
executors than upon the Government. Chief Judge Jones in his dissenting opinion expressed a sounder solution to the dilemma:
The correction is being made at the instance of plaintiffs. It
seems fair that as a condition to the change in valuation they
should be willing to surrender the advantage which had come to
them by2 7 reason of the undervaluation they are seeking to
change."

This result would leave the parties in the financial position they would
have assumed by a correct valuation of the stock.
MICHAEL WHERRY

Torts-Negligence: Recovery for Traumatic Neurosis-Plaintiff, the driver of an automobile struck by defendant's car, received
a brain concussion during the collision and was thrown onto the
pavement. Regaining consciousness and observing defendant lying
on the pavement apparently dead, and bleeding, and his elderly
wife standing there helpless and confused, plaintiff became hysterical, commenced crying, shaking, and complained of a headache.
On appeal from an award to plaintiff for mental and physical injuries, the r&cord indicated that plaintiff had experienced a traumatic neurosis-an anxiety reaction precipitated by a trauma. A
psychiatrist testified that the brain concussion served as a "competent reducing cause" which weakened plaintiff's powers of repression. Plaintiff, having a repressed hatred for his father, associated

27

against her for past due estate income taxes. Her claim of recoupment was
granted on the grounds that the true net estate was greatly reduced by the
liability for income taxes in 1949. With regard to the single taxable event
theory, the court stated at 228 "The Government has received monies which
in equity and good conscience belong to the taxpayer. . . . It is true that in
the Bull case both claims grew out of the same transaction and were asserted
against the same money in the hands of the executor; but that in practical
effect, is the situation that prevails here. The Government has asserted two
claims against the monies of the estate that came into the hands of the administratrix, one on account of past due income taxes, and the other on account of the estate tax due on the net estate, and it is impossible to determine
the amount of the latter without making due allowance for the deduction
caused by the former." Accord: Bowcutt v. U.S., 175 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mont.,
1959).
Supra note 9, at 23, 24.

